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Resumen: Este artículo estudia los efectos en las primas de seguros y el bienestar del 
consumidor cuando existen comisiones de las agencias aseguradoras y és¬
tas son utilizadas estratégicamente para vender pólizas de seguros. Se con¬
sidera el comportamiento oportunista de las agencias de seguros que ven-
den la póliza de pago por comisión más alta. También están consideradas 
lasdiferentesestructurasdemercado, llamadas: duopolio de aseguradoras 
que compiten por comisiones (competencia entre aseguradoras), colusión 
entre asegurados con aseguradoras permaneciendo independientes (colu-
sión horizontal o monopolio de asegurados) y colusión entre asegurados y 
aseguradoras (integración vertical o agentes exclusivos. Encontramos que 
la competencia entre aseguradoras y la integración vertical logran primas 
más altas que la colusión horizontal con agencias independientes. También 
demostramos que la comisión óptima, desde el punto de vista del consu-
midor puede ser más grande que la comisión ofrecida por cualquiera de las 
otras tres estructuras de mercado antes mencionadas. 
Abstract: This paper studies the effects on insurance premiums and consumer wel-
fare when commissions to insurance agencies exist and are used strategi-
cally to sell insurance policies. The opportunistic behavior of agency in-
surers that sell the policy paying the highest commission is considered. 
(vertical integration or exclusive agents). We find that insurer competition 
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1. Introduction 
Since the 1980s several arguments for trade policy have received substan-
tial theoretical attention. These arguments locate the market failure that 
justifies government intervention in the absence of perfect competition. In 
some industries, they point out, there are only a few firms in effective com-
petition. Because of the small number of firms, the assumptions of perfect 
competition do not apply. In particular, there will typically be excess re-
turns and so, competition over who gets these profits. In this case, it is pos-
sible for a government to alter the rules of the game to shift these excess 
returns from foreign to domestic firms. How the government should inter-
vene depends on the market structure. There are many works that analyse 
the optimal intervention for différents market structures and types of com-
petition. Of special relevance are Brander and Spencer (1994), Eaton and 
Grossman (1995), Dixit and Grossman (1896), Horstmann and Markusen 
(1986), Carmichael (1987) and Gruenspecht (1988). These works assume 
implicitly that inputs are manufactured inside the firms or purchased in a 
competitive market. More recently, Spencer and Jones (1991, 1992), Jones 
and Spencer (1989), Ishikawa and Spencer (1999), Ishikawa and Lee 
(1997) , Bernhofen (1996, 1997), Chang and Chen (1994) and Ishikawa 
(1998) have studied the general issue of trade policy in the presence of 
firms with vertical links. 
Most of these works on strategic trade policy establish assumptions 
that result in a Stackelberg
1 solution for two reasons. First, in the works that 
consider firms with vertical links, an upstream monopoly or oligopoly pro-
duces an intermediate good and a downstream monopoly or oligopoly, 
purchases the intermediate good, taking its price as given, and combines it 
with a complementary good to produce a final good. Second, a government 
establishes its trade or industrial policy, and policy-taker firms react by ma-
king their investment and production decisions.
2 The first assumption, that 
upstream producers set a single take-it-or-leave-it price, is an oversimplifi-
cation of vertical relationships. If we assume that the downstream market is 
characterized by imperfect competition, the downstream producer is likely 
to have some influence on the price of the upstream producer. As a result, 
1 We will use "Stackelberg game" to refer to a game with sequential decision-making. 
2 See, for example, Salinger (1988), Spencer and Jones (1991, 1992), Rodrik and Yoon 
(1989), Ishikawa and Lee (1997), Bernhofen (1997), Spencer and Raubitschek (1996), Ishika-
wa (1998), Ishikawa and Spencer (1999) and the references therein. TRADE POLICY 135 
some authors have relaxed the price-taker behavior in the antitrust literatu-
re. Tiróle (1988), Economides and Salop (1992),
3 and Young (1991) assu-
me that the rival firms make pricing decision simultaneously and reach 
Nash equilibrium instead of the usual Stackelberg solution.
4 This literature 
shows that integration by complementary product firms raises welfare and 
profits, giving incentives to firms to integrate. However, in the strategic 
trade policy literature, Ishikawa and Spencer (1999) recognize the techni-
cal difficulties of relaxing the assumption of price-taker behavior in order 
to incorporate monopsony power by downstream firms. 
With respect to the second assumption: that firms take government po-
licy as given, several authors
5 argue that firms facing an active trade policy 
make strategic movements designed to influence government decisions, 
and that such movements can be justified by investment costs and by the 
bargaining power of multinationals in negotiating with developing country 
governments. Given high investment costs and the competition for foreign 
investment among developing countries, it is hoped that the decisions of 
firms are based on their expectations of and/or influence on the govern-
ment's trade policy. An example of an active government policy comes 
from the "maquiladora"
6 industry in developing countries. One can think 
of Mexico as the home country, the USA as the market, and a firm owned by 
either Mexican or a third country residents. The Mexican government's po-
licy has been to promote the maquiladora industry by giving advantages to 
Mexican and/or foreign firms, in order to encourage the production of 
goods with Mexican content for export to the USA.
7 We argue that when the 
government is actively intervening in a complementary goods industry and 
3 They cited Cournot's (1838) model of a complementary duopoly. 
4 Young (1991) questions the assertion that the case of complementary goods is "equiva-
lent" to successive monopoly. If the upstream firm chooses the wholesale price and the 
downstream firm simultaneously sets the retail price, no Nash equilibrium is obtained. He as-
sumes that firms choose simultaneously mark-ups over marginal cost instead of prices. Salin-
ger (1989) overcomes several such obstacles by introducing conjectural variations. 
5 See Helpman and Krugman (1989), Gonzalez (1993), Carmichael (1987), Gruenspecht 
(1988), Kleit (1992), and Dixit and Kyle (1985), among others. 
6 A maquiladora is an assembly or manufacturing operation in Mexico for export that 
may be 100% foreign-owned. A maquiladora utilizes competitively-priced Mexican labor in 
assembling and/or manufacturing good using temporarily imported components from the U.S. 
and other sources. 
7 Low interest loans to finance export, free advice for exporting firms and low income-
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it is unable to commit itself to its trade instruments, the firms' incentives to 
integrate may change. 
The main goal of this paper is to study strategic trade policies and their 
effects on the decisions of firms producing complementary products on 
whether to integrate. The main differences with existing literature are that 
we allow the distribution of market power
8 between two firms producing 
complementary products to vary, and that we relax the assumption that the 
government trade policy is unaffected by the firms' decisions. That is, we 
investigate how an active trade or industrial policy may be altered when 
a more realistic view of firms is considered. The results on optimal trade 
policy and integration depend strongly on the distribution of the market 
power among firms, the commitment capacity of government and the 
firms' nationality. We adopt the typical assumption in this literature that all 
the production of the domestic good is for export.
9 
We start by defining the parameters that model the distribution of mar-
ket power between bilateral monopolists in the intermediate market as well 
as the integration level. We use this parameterization to show the standard 
result: that integration by complementary product firms raises welfare and 
profits independently of firms' market power. Thus, we would predict full 
integration under the assumption that when firms decide to integrate, they 
take trade policy as given. However, this result changes if we assume that 
government trade policy is affected by the firms' decisions and that resi-
dents of the home country own both firms. Then, the objective of trade po-
licy is to maximize the profitability of the export industry. Under these 
assumptions, we find that when firms are fully integrated, government in-
tervention is unnecessary for welfare maximization. On the other hand, 
when firms are not integrated, then the government has incentives to subsi-
dize exports in order to achieve the integrated level of welfare. This sub-
sidy means a transfer from government to firms; so non-integrated firms 
would be better off than integrated firms. As a result, firms prefer not to in-
tegrate. 
The above result changes when one of the firms is domestically-owned 
and the other one is foreign. In this case there are several possible outco-
mes depending on firms' market power. When the home firm has all the 
8 We will refer to market or bargaining power as the capacity of each firm to price its 
product above its marginal cost. 
9 This assumption was introduced by Brander and Spencer (1985) and Eaton and Gross-
man (1986) in order to ignore the effects of changes in home consumption on welfare. TRADE POLICY  137 
market power, then the optimal policy is non-intervention, whether or not 
firms are integrated. Since the final output is exported, the goal of govern-
ment policy remains the maximization of the net profits of the home firm. 
The home country may extract rents from two sources: the foreign consu-
mer surplus and foreign firm's profits. When home firm has all market 
power, it can obtain all these rents by itself. Thus, the government has no 




When both firms have the same market power, or when the foreign 
firm is the Stackelberg leader and firms are not integrated, then the govern-
ment should subsidize or tax the home firm's production depending on 




 The appropriate government policy causes the foreign firm to reduce 
its price and allows the domestic firm to obtain the Stackelberg leader 
rents. Then the price of the final good is reduced in the case of comple-
ments and increased in the case of substitutes. In the substitutes case, with 
the tax, the home country government achieves a higher price for the do-
mestically produced product. In other words, by taxing home production, it 
shifts some of pure profits (due to imperfect markets) from the foreign to 
the domestic firm. The subsidy in the complements case is less intuitive. 
We argue that with complements the Stackelberg leader prices lower than 
the follower does, because if the leader increases his price, the follower 
will do the same. So the final price would be too high causing an excessive 
reduction in sales. Thus, in order to avoid too high a price the government 
subsidies domestic production. On the other hand, if firms decide to inte-
grate, the optimal policy changes from a subsidy to a tax in the case of 
complements, and implies a higher tax in the case of substitutes. Thus, 
firms decide not to integrate. This is because integration implies lower pri-
ces for the domestic product in world markets. Subsiding or taxing imports 
of an intermediate good depending on whether the home firm's actions are 
strategic complements or substitutes obtains the same result. 
The paper is organized as follows. In the next section we develop the 
basic model. In section three, we study the integration decision under a 
1
0
 Following the literature, we call the non-integrated inefficiency "double marginaliza-
tion". See Tirole (1988). 
1
1
 Firm's actions are strategically complements (substitutes) when an increase in the 
price of the other firm (due, for example, to a tax) triggers an increase (reduction) in its own 
price. This terminology comes from Bulow, Geanakoplos and Klemperer (1985). 138 ESTUDIOS ECONÓMICOS 
passive trade policy. In section four, we analyze the interaction between 
trade policy and firms' merger decisions. Section five concludes. 
2. The Model 
First, let us suppose that there are two firms producing two perfect com-
plementary goods or components. Firm /=1,2 produces component Z, at 
constant marginal cost c/; and sells this component at price . The two 
components are combined in fixed proportions (one unit of each) to produ-
ce a composite product or final good. Demand for the final good is denoted 
by Z(p) and depends on the sum of the two component prices: p=P\+p2-
We assume that the demand is twice-continuously differentiable and 
strictly downward sloping. If we re-interpret this model in terms of two 
vertically related firms,
12 then firm 1 produces an intermediate good and 
sells it at unit price px = c\ +nti, where ni\ represents the mark-up over mar-
ginal cost. Firm 2 needs one unit of intermediate good to produce one unit 
of the final good, and sells the final product at price p=pi+c2+m2, where 
m2 represents the mark-up over firm 2 marginal cost. Thenp2=c2+m2. P
ro~ 
fit of firms 1 and 2 are given, respectively, by: 
Ul=(pl-cl)Z(Pl+p2) (1) 
n2 = (p2-c2)z(Pl+P2) (2) 
In these equations we see a problem of non-integrated, non-competiti-
ve firms: there is an externality, since a firm that raises its price gets all the 
benefits from the increased mark-up, while the other firm shares the costs 
of a reduced level of demand for the composite good. We would therefore 
expect that integration would yield a lower price/higher output of the com-
bined good. This intuition will be confirmed below. 
Assume that firms 1 and 2 solve, respectively, the following problems: 
Max^Ax = aYlx + {\-b)U2 (3) 
1
2
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Maxp2A2 = (l-a)Ul + bU1 (4) 
These firms' objective functions can be understood as "generalized" 
objective functions. When firm i=l,2 chooses its own price, it takes the 
price of the complementary good as given. Thus, we solve for the Nash 
equilibrium in prices taking the generalized objective functions. We may 
adapt several possible interpretations from the literature. Following Flat 
(1989, 1990, 1991), the parameters a and b may be shareholding interlocks. 
Flat assumes silent financial interests: "each firm's objective is to maximi-
ze the value of its assets, including equity holdings in other firms, but it 
controls only its own product". In a managerial incentive schemes context, 
each manager chooses the price of the product that the firm he runs produ-
ces. The owner would pay him according to the objective function defined 
in (3) or (4), plus a fixed salary.
1
3
 We do not adopt any particular interpre-
tation, but we just take problems (3) and (4) as a way to define a set of pa-
rameters that determine the structure of the industry. Our goal is to show 
that the solution of these problems covers most kinds of vertical relations-
hips: non integration and integration, for any distribution of market or bar-
gaining power between firms, FOCS from problems (3) and (4) are given, 
respectively, by: 
a{(p,-Cl)Z'+Z}H\-b)(p2-c2)Z' = 0 (5) 
{\-a){Px-cx)Z + b{{P2-c2)Z<+Z} = 0 (6) 
Solving (5) and (6) for each firms' mark-up we obtain: 
(Pl-cx)Z' + bZ=0 (7) 
(p2-c2)Z' + aZ=0 (8) 
From the sum of (7) and (8) we get: 
(p-c)Z' + SZ=0 (9) 
where S = a+b and c=cx+c2. 
1
3
 See Fershtman (1985), Fershtman and Judd (1987), Vickers (1985), and Sklivas 
(1987) for this kind of models. 140  ESTUDIOS ECONÓMICOS 
Equations (7) and (8) also may be obtained from the solution of the fo-
llowing problem: 
MaxPl!P2 nf n? (io) 
subject to the condition a+b=\. This objective function comes from the 




 Then, equations (7) and (8) characterize the outcome 
of a bargaining problem that fulfills the Nash Axioms.
1
5
 The outcome may 
come from collusion, absorption, integration, or any other bargaining pro-
cess. Although the Generalized Nash Bargaining Solution specifies a+b=\, 
we also let a+b^\ in order to include other vertical market structures. 
From (7), (8) and (9) we obtain the following expression: 
p—c_p\ — C\ P2-C2 _b a 8 
p ~ p p
 =£
 + e~iF 
Thus, we have a decomposition of the Lerner Index in terms of firms' 
market powers. Note that the mark-up of each firm is related directly to its 
bargaining power, and does not depend on the market power of the other 
firm. Also note that this expression makes sense only if e>a+b. 
If both FOC's are satisfied, then the second-order condition is 2-A>0, 
where A=ZZ"/Z'
2 is a parameter that indicates the convexity of the de-
mand. Assuming that demand function is not "too convex", then the se-
cond-order condition for each firm's problem is satisfied and the FOCs 
given in (5) and (6) are sufficient for equilibrium. In particular, the second 




 (A=l+l/e) if £>1. In the latter case, the condition implies 
the second order condition. Next, we will define the most common vertical 
market structures in terms of parameters a, b and 8. 
Generalized Nash Bargaining Solution: As we have shown above, it is 
enough to set a+b=l. 
Non-cooperative Stackelberg Solution: Assume that firm 1 is the Stackel¬
berg leader and firm 2 is the follower, so firm 2 chooses p2 to maximize 
1
4
 For example, when a=\ and 6=0 then firm 2 has all the bargaining power. 
See Binmore (1994), Eichberger (1993). 
1
6
 That is Z=Ap \ where A is a positive constant. TRADE POLICY 141 
its own profits taking Pl as given. The FOC to this problem is given by (8) 
with a=\: 
(p2-c2)Z'+Z=0 (11) 
The Second Order Condition, given by 2-A>0, ensures that the solu-
tion of (11) yields a local maximum. Solving (11) for p2 we get the "reac-
tion function" which we denote by: p2=R2(p{). The sign of the slope of 
reaction function is obtained by differentiating firm 2's FOC (11) with res-
pect toph which becomes: 
= <
12> 
From the Second Order Condition, we thus have sign(R2) =s/gn(A-l). 
Following Bulow, Geanakoplos and Klemperer (1985), if R2 >0 (A>1) 
then firm 2's actions are strategic complements, and if R2 <0 (A<1) then 
the firm 2's actions are strategic substitutes. The sign of R2 depends on the 
demand specification. For example, for linear demand R2 =-1/2<0 and for 
constant-elasticity demand R2=l/(e-l)>0. Following with the Stackelberg 
solution, firm 1 choosespx to maximize: 
ni = (/»i-c,)Z(/>,+rt2(pi) (13) 
The FOC for this problem is given by: 
(14) 
so defining a and b in (7) and (8) as follows: 
a= 1 and = 2-A>0 (14) 
we obtain the non-integrated Stackelberg equilibrium. Furthermore, from 
the second order condition, we have b>0 and <5=3-A>l. Note that when the 
follower's actions are strategic substitutes (complements) then b>a (b<a). 
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Proposition 1: The Stackelberg leader sets a higher (lower) mark-up than 
the follower when follower's actions are strategic substitutes (comple-
ments). 
The intuition behind this proposition is simple. An increase in leader's 
price causes the follower to increase or reduce its price depending on whet-
her its actions are strategic complements or substitutes. In the latter case, 
the leader may set a relatively higher price than in the former case without 
an important reduction in sales. 
Non-cooperative Nash solution: The Nash solution assumes that each firm 
takes the price of the other firm as given, taking as objective its own pro-
fits. Then in (13), R2' = ®. This implies that if we set a=b=\ and 5=2, we ob-
tain the Nash Solution. The same condition is obtained using the Young 
(1991) approach. 
Perfect Competition: Under perfect competition, Pi=ch z=l,2. This case 
can be represented by setting a=b=8=0. 
In general terms, we can state the next proposition: 
Proposition 2. The solution to the problems (3) and (4) and (10), charac-
terized by equations (7), (8) and (9) cover most kinds of vertical relati-
onships: 
i) If a-b=8=0, we have perfect competition. 
ii) If 8= 1 we have the cooperative solution for any distribution of bargai-
ning/market powers among firms. 
iii) If8>0 there is some degree of market power. 
iv) If8>\ then in addition to market power, there is some degree of non-
cooperation. 
v) If aft in cases ii), iii) and iv) above there is some degree of asymme-
tric bargaining power. 
This proposition allows us to define 8 = a+b as an "integration index" 
or "integration level". If 5=1, then the firms are fully integrated. When 
5>1 the firms are not integrated at all. When 0<<5<1 firms do not have 
complete market power in final market. TRADE POLICY  143 
Conjectural Variation: It is possible to rewrite this result in terms of conjec-




where the terms ft, z=l,2 represent the beliefs about how firm z's optimal 
behavior changes as Pj changes. If ft—0=1,2) then we have a competiti-
ve market. If Y\ y2=l then we get the Nash Bargaining Solution. If ft = 0, 
(z'=l,2), then we obtain the Nash Equilibrium. If ft=0 and Yj-R}, i,j=\,2, 
i£j then firm i is the Stackelberg leader and firm j is the follower. 
3. Integration 
In this section, we study the effect of integration decisions on prices and in-
dustry profits. The effects of integration on the final price is obtained from 
the implicit differentiation of equation (9) with respect to 5. 
= >0 (17) 
08 (1+5(1-A))Z' 
Thus, an increase in the integration level (reduction in 8) reduces the 
final price. To study the effects of an increase of 8 on profits, we compute 
the optimal value of 8, that is, the value of 8 that maximizes the sum of 
profits (1) and (2), given by: 
n = (P-c)z. (is) 
The FOCofthis problem is: 
(p-c)Z'+Z=Q (19) 
If we set 5=1 in equation (9), we get equation (19). Since we know 
that 5=1 implies full integration, equation (19) tell us that this is an opti-
mum. Thus, we have the standard result that integration by firms producing 
complementary products raises welfare and profits independently of the 
distribution of bargaining/market power among firms. Nevertheless, it is 
possible to observe values of 8£1 due to factors not included in the present 144  ESTUDIOS ECONÓMICOS 
model. For example, the presence of substitute products in the market 
would trigger some competition, which would explain values of 5<1. The 
cost of obtaining full cooperation due to imperfect information or bargai-
ning process may lead to values of <5>1. Of course, it should be emphasi-
zed that 5=1 is a second best result from welfare viewpoint, because, 
joint-ownership price exceeds the optimal price (p= c) that would be obtai-
ned by optimal regulation. 
4. Trade Policy 
In this section, we analyze the effect of an active trade policy on the inte-
gration decision. To introduce trade policies into the model, we assume that 
the government taxes (subsidizes) firm 1 's production with a tax (subsidy) 
rate r>0 (/<0). We redefine marginal costs as follows: cx=c\+t and 
c=cx+c2- We will refer to the country that chooses the tax as the home 
country. The rest of the world's government trade policy is fixed. We assu-
me that all the home production is for export. 
The full integration result of the previous section rests on the assump-
tion that the tax rate is fixed when firms decide whether to integrate in 
some way (for example; bargaining, takeover, etc.). In game theory terms, 
in the first stage the government decides the tax rate, in the second stage 
firms decide whether to integrate, and in the third stage firms choose pri-
ces. This sequence implies that the government's choice of trade policy is 
taken independently of the firms' decisions on integration. However, as we 
argue in the introduction, firms make strategic movements- designed to in-
fluence government decisions. To analyze how the decision to fully inte-
grate, obtained in the previous section, changes when government policies 
are affected by firms' decisions, we change the sequence of the game. In 
the first stage firms decide whether to integrate. In the second stage, the go-
vernment chooses the tax rate to maximize welfare. In the third stage the 
firms choose prices. We study the effects of this tax on prices, profits and 
ned by the implicit differentiation of (7), (8) and (9) with respect to the tax: 
§P= 1 
8t 1+(1-A)<5 











That is, the firm that must pay the tax (firm 1) increases its price and 
the final price rises. However, the direction of the change of the other 
firm's price in response to an increase in the tax paid by firm 1 is ambi-
guous. When firms 2's actions are strategic complements (substitutes), then 
it increases (reduces) its price. For example, for linear demand 
-a/(l+5)<0, and for constant-elasticity demand 8p2/dt= a/(e-S)>0. 
To analyze the effect of the tax on firms' integration decisions, we 
compute the optimal tax for any degree of integration. We define the opti-
mal tax as the value of / that maximizes home welfare, which due to the ab-
sence of home consumption, is defined as follows:
1
7 
W=alnl + a2Tl2+tZ (23) 
where ah i=l,2 are weights on firms' profits and the last term on the right 
side represents tax revenues. By giving different values to ah z'=l,2, we 
can analyze several typical cases in the literature of trade policy: firms may 
be owned by residents of the home country or may be foreign-owned. An 
implicit expression for the optimal tax is given in the next lemma: 
Lemma 1: The tax rate that maximizes welfare (23) is given by: 
'=(l-r)(/>-£)=-(r-<5)§ (24) 
where, T= 1 + (2-A)(<5-axb-a2a). 
Proof: See Appendix 
From this lemma we see that the sign of that is whether a tax or a 
subsidy is optimal, depends on the parameters of the model. 
1
7
 We are assuming a partial equilibrium model, so that we do not take into account the 
effect that the financing of government has on the behavior of firms. 146  ESTUDIOS ECONÓMICOS 
In the first stage firms decide to integrate if their joint profits are grea-
ter when they are integrated than when they are not integrated. Thus, we 
need to compare joint profits under the integrated structure and the non-in-
tegrated structure. In terms of the model, the integration decision causes a 
change in the parameters a and b. Let da and db be the changes in a and 
b.
18 The change in joint profits, denoted by dTl, due to a change in a and b 
is given by dTl=-^ da + ^db. We have to take into account that the opti-
mal tax depends on whether firms are integrated. So, we must consider the 
change in t due to a change in a and b, which we denote by dt. In next 
lemma we give the change in profits due to a change in parameters a and b. 
Lemma 2. If the firms are integrated, the change in profits due to a change 
in the parameters a and b is given by: 
<m=-Zdt=K{(£-\Xax - a2)(bda- adb) - a2da- axdb) 
where K is a positive value. 
Proof: See Appendix. 
From lemma 2, firms will decide to integrate if the tax is lower (or the 
subsidy is higher) when they are integrated than when they are not integra-
ted. Thus, as an approach, we need to compare the optimal tax under the in-
tegrated structure and the non-integrated structure. 
Next, we analyze the optimal tax (24) and the direction of the change 
in t due to the integration decision for different values for ah i=\,2. 
Case 1. Assume that firms are domestically-owned, the tax is on the ex-
ports of the final good and there is no domestic consumption. We can 
analyze this case by setting a1=a2=l- The resulting welfare function is 
equivalent to the one used by Brander and Spencer (1985) and Eaton and 




 For example, if firm 1 has all market power, then a=\ and 6=2-A under non-integra-
ted structure, and a=0 and 6=1 under integrated structure. Then, if firms decide to integrate 
da=-l anddb=-(l-A). We are assuming that firms maintain their bargaining powers after in-
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From lemma 2, the integration decision implies dt>0. Then, from this 
fact and (25) we conclude: 
Proposition 3: When both firms are domestically-owned and production is 
for export, firms prefer not to integrate at all. The optimal policy is: 
i) to subsidize exports when firms are not integrated at all (S> I), 
n) not to intervene when firm are fully integrated (5=1) and 
iii) to tax exports when firms do not have all market power in the final 
market (8<\). 
The objective of the government in choosing t is to maximize the pro-
fitability of the industry. When 5<1 firms face some competition in the 
final market. Thus, the government has incentives to tax exports in order to 
avoid having home set too low a price.
1
9
 When <5>1, firms are not integra-
ted at all. Then the government should subsidize firms in order to achieve 
the integrated level of welfare. This subsidy means a transfer from govern-
ment to firms, so non-integrated firms would benefit more than integrated 
firms. That is, firms obtain higher profits by not integrating. 
Case 2. Assume that the firm facing the tax is domestically-owned and that 
the other one is foreign, and that all final output is exported («1=1, c^=0). 
The resulting welfare function is similar to the one used by Bernhofen 
(1997). An example of this industry structure comes from the maquiladoras 
industry. One can think of Mexico as the home country with a Mexican and 
a Korean firm. The welfare-maximizing policy of the Mexican government 
may be to subsidize a maquiladoras industry exporting a Mexican-Korean 
composite good to the USA. From lemma 1, the optimal tax becomes: 
, = -(l+(l-A)«-*)f (26) 
There are several subcases depending on firms' market power. If we 
assume that the home firm has all the market power, then, from lemma 1 
the optimal tax is equal to zero, whether or not firms are integrated. Then 
,
9
 This is the classical argument from international trade policy when the home country 
has market power in world markets. See Krugman and Obsfeld (1995). 148  ESTUDIOS ECONÓMICOS 
the optimal policy is not to intervene and firms decide to integrate in order 
to avoid the intermediate market inefficiency. 
When both firms have the same market power or the foreign firm is the 
Stackelberg leader then sign(t)=sign(\-A). Thus the government subsidi-
zes (taxes) domestic production when foreign firm's actions are strategic 
complements (substitutes). Furthermore, if firms decide to integrate, from 
lemma 2, dt>0, i.e. if firms are integrated the government sets a higher tax 
(lower subsidy) than if firms are not integrated. Then, it is better for the 
firms not to integrate. We summarized this in next proposition: 
Proposition 4: When one of the firms is domestically-owned, the other one 
is foreign and all the final output is exported, then: 
i) If the home firm is the Stackelberg leader, then the government does 
not intervene andfirms decide to integrate. 
ii) If both firms have the same market power or if the foreign firm is the 
Stackelberg leader, then the government subsidizes (taxes) exports 
when the foreign firm's actions are strategic complements (substitu-
tes). Firms decide not to integrate. 
Since the final output is exported, the goal of the government is to ma-
ximize the profitability of the industry. There are two rent extraction sour-
ces: foreign consumer surplus and foreign firm profits. In case i), when 
home firm has all market power, it can get all the rents by itself. Then, go-
vernment has no incentives to intervene. In case ii), when firms have the 
same market power or the foreign firm is the Stackelberg leader, then the 
government has incentives to intervene in order to transfer the Stackelberg 
rents to the home country. As we note in proposition 1, the Stackelberg lea-
der sets its prices higher (lower) than the follower does, depending on 
whether the follower's actions are strategic substitutes (complements). 
Since the home firm does not make the first move, it needs the commit-
ment capacity that government taxes (subsidies) gives. In this way, the 
home country firm produces the Stackelberg level of outcome. 
Case 3. Assume that the firm facing the tax is foreign, that the other firm is 
domestically-owned and all final output is exported (a^O, «2=1). Conti-
nuing with the maquiladoras example, the foreign firm is a Korean firm 
using Mexican inputs to export to the USA. The tax would be a tariff on im-TRADE POLICY  149 
ports of Korean intermediate products. The results of this case are quite si-
milar to case two. We simply replace the terms export tax or subsidy with 
the terms import tax or subsidy. The rest of the conditions and the results 
do not change. 
5. Conclusions 
In this paper, we review the traditional result that integration among firms 
producing complementary products improves economic efficiency. First, 
we define the parameters that model the integration structure for different 
distributions of bargaining power between firms and for different levels of 
integration. This parameterization gives us the classical result that integra-
tion by firms producing complementary products raises welfare and profits 
independently of firms' bargaining power. We use this model to study how 
an active trade policy may provide incentives for firms to refrain from inte-
grating. The decision on whether or not to do so depends on the optimal 
trade policy, which in turn depends on whether firms are foreign or domes-
tically-owned and the bargaining power of the home firm. Further research 
might consider a more complete trade policy in the sense of a wider array 
of trade policy instruments. For example, one could examine the effects of 
both a subsidy for domestic production and a tariff on imports of interme-
diate goods. Furthermore, since the results depend on functional forms, it is 
necessary to obtain econometric estimates of the parameters of the model 
for different industries. 
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Appendix 
Proof of lemma 1: 
The first order condition coming from maximization of the welfare func-
tion (25) is given by: 
ax {(Pl - cOZ'p, + (Pll - 1)Z} + ^{(pj - c2)Z'Pl +p2lZ} + tZ'p, + Z=0 152 ESTUDIOS ECONÓMICOS 
A1 
Substituting (7) and (8) into Al we obtain: 
ax{bZPl-(pXt-l)Z-a2{aZpt-p2lZ}+tZ'pt + Z=Q 
Using (20), (21) and (22) and solving for t we obtain: 
t = |, {8- 1 - (2-A)(<5- axb - aid)} 
Let be T = 1 + (2 - A)(<5- axb - c^a), then, 
From (9) we obtain: 
A2 
Then, solving for t we have: 
•(I-Í)Ü.-Í> 
Proof of lemma 2: 
The change in n due to a change in a and è is given by: 
dn^da + fdb 
A3 
• 
Since we know that the price of the profits depend on t(a,b) and on a 
and b, i.e., TRADE POLICY  153 
Thus, 





Then, if the firms are fully integrated, from (19) we obtain: 
dTl=-Zdt 
A9 
Now, the change in t due to a change in a and b is given by: 
dt = tada + tbdb, 154  ESTUDIOS ECONÓMICOS 
A10 
We compute ta by taking the implicit derivative of (24) with respect to a: 
t„ 
All 
The term t„ can be computed in the same way. 
t'-y-rída-ÍP-^da r 
Since we know that the price of the final good depends on t(a,b) and on a 




From (17) and A2 we get: 
A13 
Then, substituting^;; and ¿75 into^;2 we get: 
dp _ Tta+ p-c 
a^~(i+(i-A)S)r 
A14 
Now, to computet;;, we have also to compute the following: 
A x 1~ T^(2
— A)(l—(X2) 
rA-^-r TRADE POLICY  155 
A15 
Substituting A14 and A15 into All and solving for ta we obtain: 
A16 
Following the same steps for tb, we obtain 
((2-AXl-q,Xl+(l-A)g) Mp-e) 
*
 1 (i-A)r+i > r 
A17 
So, substituting A16 and Al7 into ¿70, we have: 
- adb) - Oh da -1 
where 
dt = K {(1- A)(aj - otri)(bda - adb) -o^da- axdb} 
_ (p-c)(2-A) 
*~(i + (i-A)r)r 